The removal of Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo from office has rightly attracted public attention. Yet what has not been closely examined is not whether a President can remove a Chief Justice—the Constitution anticipates that possibility under strict conditions—but whether the same process can be used to remove her also as a Justice of the Supreme Court.
It is here that constitutional lines begin to blur, and where executive overreach threatens to destabilise the very balance of powers.
Scope of Petition vs Scope of Removal
The 1992 Constitution makes a deliberate distinction between the Chief Justice and the other Justices of the Supreme Court. Article 128 lists them separately. Article 144 prescribes different appointment processes.
These textual distinctions matter because removal must mirror the terms of appointment. Petitions against Justice Torkornoo were framed around her leadership as Chief Justice.
The Council of State reviewed those petitions, and the committee of inquiry conducted its hearings on that basis. Every stage of the process was scoped to her administrative role at the helm of the judiciary.
Yet, the presidential warrant did more: it declared her removed not only from the Chief Justiceship but also from her commission as a Justice of the Supreme Court. That extension is constitutionally precarious.
Why Overreach Matters
Had the warrant been confined to her Chief Justice role, the process would have stood on firmer ground. Article 146 clearly provides a path for removing a Chief Justice who has been found culpable of misconduct or incapacity.
But by reaching into her separate role as Justice, without petitions or inquiry directed at that office, the Presidency stepped outside the boundaries of Article 146.
This conflation undermines the separation of powers, setting a precedent where the executive could, with a stroke of the pen, reshape the judiciary. Equally concerning is the silence of the bench itself.
None of the other Justices has acted suo motu – on their own motion – to question the validity of the warrant’s scope. Judicial restraint has its place, but in matters that touch the independence of the judiciary itself, silence risks normalising an erosion that weakens them all.
The President’s Likely Defence – and Why It Falls Short
The Presidency may argue that once removed as Chief Justice, her judicial commission cannot stand – that the two roles are inseparable. Or that the committee’s recommendation implicitly covered her entire judicial office.
But that defence falters on three grounds: Textual separation: Articles 128 and 144 treat the two roles differently; separate appointments must mean separate removals. Due process: If the petition and inquiry never addressed her role as Justice, then the Article 146 procedure for that office was never satisfied.
Precedent: In Agyei-Twum and Dery, the Supreme Court stressed strict compliance with Article 146. The Court has never allowed implied powers to stretch removal proceedings.
Even if the President claims to have “merely issued a letter following recommendations,” the warrant cannot stand if it extends beyond the actual scope of those recommendations. That is precisely where the overreach lies.
Beyond One Judge – The Danger Ahead
This is not just about Justice Torkornoo. Today it is her; tomorrow it could be any Chief Justice. If this stands, future administrations could exploit the precedent, using petitions about administrative leadership to wipe out judicial tenure entirely.
Such a tactic could become a playbook for political control of the courts, turning the security of judges into a function of executive satisfaction rather than constitutional procedure. And this concern is not confined to Ghana.
Justice Torkornoo has already filed a petition before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Ghana’s Attorney General has raised preliminary objections, but if admissibility is cleared, the African Court could well become a parallel venue where the same scope-versus-removal argument is tested under regional human rights law.
The Real Test
The framers of our Constitution intended that judges be protected from political storms through precise and limited removal procedures.
By exceeding those limits, the Presidency risks creating a precedent that compromises judicial independence for years to come. The principle should remain simple and inviolable: the scope of a petition defines the scope of removal. No more, no less.
Could Overreach Be Grounds for Impeachment?
Some observers have even raised the question of whether this act could itself be impeachable. After all, deliberately extending a removal warrant beyond the scope of a petition and inquiry under Article 146 strikes at the heart of the Constitution and undermines judicial independence. In theory, such an overreach could amount to misconduct warranting presidential accountability.
Yet impeachment in Ghana is ultimately a political process. With the NDC holding a parliamentary majority, it is unlikely that the legislature would ever move against its own President – and therein lies the deeper constitutional peril.
When political dominance shields executive excess, the very checks designed to protect the judiciary risk collapsing.
